



Strategic Studies Institute **SSI**

WORLD VIEW:
The 1998 Strategic Assessment
from the Strategic Studies Institute

Edited by
Earl H. Tilford, Jr.


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
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REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE			Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188	
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188), Washington, DC 20503.				
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank)	2. REPORT DATE Feb 26, 1998	3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED Final Report		
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE World View: The 1998 Strategic Assessment from the Strategic Studies Institute (U)		5. FUNDING NUMBERS		
6. AUTHOR(S) Edited by Earl J. Tilford, Jr.				
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Publications and Production Strategic Studies Institute US Army War College Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013-5244		8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER ACN 98004		
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)		10. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER		
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES				
12a. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution unlimited		12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE		
13. ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 words) This monograph provides both individual forecasts and a collective review of the key security issues facing the United States by the analysts of the Strategic Studies Institute. Regional security forecasts are included for Europe, Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States, Eastern Europe, Asia Pacific, the Middle East and Southwest Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Latin America. The analysts also assess the future in light of the Quadrennial Defense Review and the Report of the National Defense Panel. In addition, Army issues, the future, and the Army After Next are discussed.				
14. SUBJECT TERMS strategic assessment; regional assessments; national security; Army After Next; Army XXI; Quadrennial Defense Review; Report of the National Defense Panel			15. NUMBER OF PAGES 89	
			16. PRICE CODE	
17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT Unclassified	18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE Unclassified	19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT Unclassified	20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT UL	

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FOREWORD

The following document, *World View*, presents the annual strategic assessments of the analysts at the Strategic Studies Institute. It is fifth in a series that reflects both our individual forecasts and collective review of the key security issues facing the United States. The process that produces *World View* also leads to our annual *Research and Outreach Plan*.

The strategic context is not vastly changed for 1998. It is as complex and uncertain as it has been virtually every year since the end of the Cold War. This year, however, we are also assessing the future in the light of the *Quadrennial Defense Review*, published in May 1997, and the *Report of the National Defense Panel*, issued in December.

Like the first post-Cold War decade, the first 20 years of the next century will be vibrant times for the armed forces, and the Army in particular. The 21st century, as we already see today, will be a time in which land forces play pivotal roles in the strategic environment. This central place of land forces in our national defense coincides with the evolution of the Army to Army XXI and subsequently to the Army After Next, potentially a more revolutionary transformation.

The Strategic Studies Institute offers *World View* as an assessment which we hope will be of value to strategic planners, as well as to those who have an interest in the nation's security well into the 21st century.


RICHARD H. WITHERSPOON
Colonel, U.S. Army
Director, Strategic Studies Institute

SECTION I

ARMY ISSUES, THE FUTURE AND THE ARMY AFTER NEXT

Army Issues: A Time of Change

**Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.
Douglas V. Johnson II**

The Soviet Union ended the Cold War in 1989 by signaling its intention to withdraw from the global field of battle, leaving the United States preeminent upon the global landscape. American strategists, however, found the material characteristics of the resultant international security environment difficult to define or predict. Consequently, they were slow to devise a national security strategy to deal with it. As a result, the most meaningful changes the U.S. armed forces have undergone since 1991 are that they are significantly reduced in size and considerably more engaged in lower level contingency operations.

Generally, strategists agree that the world has passed into a "post-Cold War era." But this rearward-looking, indeterminate descriptor of an international security environment cannot be perpetuated indefinitely. The United States has to break free of the conceptual constraints of the post-Cold War era. As defense strategists look to the 21st century and conceive strategies appropriate for the future international security environment, they must develop and implement a coherent plan for guiding the U.S. armed forces through a period of qualitative change.

For the Department of Defense (DoD), change has never been easy, and the post-Cold War period has provided no exception. Former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Colin Powell's efforts to set the U.S. armed forces on a course of real change met with mixed results. For

example, his "conceptual force packages" that represented a restructuring of the U.S. combatant command system proved to be too radical for the Service chiefs and the Commanders-in-Chief (CINCs) to accept. He envisioned a command structure designed to facilitate the projection of U.S. forces from the continental United States (CONUS) on westerly, easterly, and southerly axes. The new organization would have replaced the 10 combatant commands, that served so well to contain communism during the Cold War, with six. Suggesting a CONUS-based power projection strategy, the plan promised increased efficiency and substantial cost savings. Still, it was roundly rejected.

General Powell again attempted to provide a template for substantial change during his 1992 statutory review of the roles, missions, and functions of the armed forces. His February 1993 report received considerable criticism, not because it contained controversial recommendations but because it did not. Although early drafts of the report recommended significant changes for the U.S. armed forces, the final report, for the most part, endorsed the *status quo* and contributed little to the expected "peace dividend."

Dissatisfied, the U.S. Congress mandated that the Secretary of Defense establish an independent Commission on Roles and Missions (CORM) to review the appropriateness of the allocations of roles, missions, and functions among the armed forces, evaluate and report on alternative allocations, and make recommendations for changes. The report of the CORM, however, did not venture far beyond the modest changes previously recommended by General Powell.

Again Congress acted, and required the Secretary of Defense to begin conducting quadrennial defense reviews and to subject the results of the reviews to the analysis of an independent defense panel. The panel was to recommend alternative force structures for the Secretary's and Congress' consideration. The panel stopped short of making such recommendations. As this process continues, it is

unclear that it will result in real change for the U.S. armed forces.

Undeterred by these halting attempts to begin a process of change that will ensure the U.S. armed forces are able to deal effectively and efficiently with the national security challenges and opportunities of the 21st century, national security strategists have begun plotting a course of real change. A roadmap is slowly but certainly taking form that will guide the DoD through an evolutionary transformation from its current force, to an interim Joint Vision 2010 force, to the force that will be required for the period 2020 and beyond.

Pragmatically, change within DoD must be evolutionary for at least two reasons. First, DoD has ongoing national security responsibilities that preclude revolutionary restructuring that would significantly diminish the U.S. military's current effectiveness. Second, DoD's internal bureaucracy and the external bureaucracies and political forces with which it must contend create strong inertia which restrains DoD from radical metamorphosis. The department, therefore, must effect change in an incremental or evolutionary manner. This is not to suggest that the U.S. armed forces of the 21st century will not be significantly different from those of today; they likely will be.

The emerging road map of change will permit the U.S. armed forces to evolve while retaining the ability to assure U.S. interests in the changed international security environment. The President's *National Security Strategy for a New Century* provides the initial vector of change. It establishes strategic priorities while recognizing that the future geostrategic environment will pose challenges to U.S. security but also will provide many opportunities to promote U.S. interests through activities that will help shape the international security environment. Thus, future U.S. armed forces must be as capable of shaping events to enhance U.S. security as they are of responding to

challenges to U.S. interests. Key decisions must be made and actions taken to ensure that the evolution of U.S. armed forces leaves them prepared to deal with 21st century opportunities as well as challenges.

Some have described the post-Cold War era as a period of strategic pause—a period in which the United States can rest while it awaits the emergence of a new or revitalized global competitor. But recent events have seriously undermined the belief that the United States can stay home and catch its breath. On the contrary, over the past 6 years, the United States has deployed military forces on 25 separate operations. These experiences confirm that no strategic pause is possible and argue, instead, that the U.S. armed forces are going to be globally engaged, shaping the international security environment for years to come. The strains that post-Cold War engagement has imposed on the U.S. military suggest that it is not optimally tailored for the new security environment.

Even the force suggested by General John Shalikashvili's *Joint Vision 2010* is not a new force designed for a new national security environment or strategy. It is a smaller, albeit improved, version of the force with which the United States emerged from the Cold War. True to its Cold War heritage, the force predominantly is a large-scale, conventional warfare, "fight and win" force. For the 21st century, a new force will be needed that preserves the warfighting essence of the *Joint Vision 2010* force but differs from that force in several significant respects.

Increased force flexibility will be needed if the military instrument of national power is to have sufficient utility in the 21st century, where the prevalent use of U.S. armed forces will be for operations other than war. A more efficient use of U.S. military capabilities will be to prevent conflict through geostrategic shaping. Nonetheless, the U.S. armed forces must be prepared to decisively defeat any opponent in war. While the U.S. military must become a more effective

fighting force, it also must be more versatile, balanced, efficient, and usable for a wide variety of missions.

Future technology will permit innovative ways of simultaneously accomplishing these seemingly competing force design goals. The costs of improving the warfighting effectiveness of the U.S. armed forces can be reduced sufficiently, with acceptable risk, to allow refocusing of adequate defense resources to develop capabilities better suited for the more diverse military missions of the 21st century. This can be accomplished by near and mid-term actions to continue the transition of current forces into Joint Vision 2010 forces through the application of information and other readily available technologies to current and soon to be fielded systems. This step in force evolution allows the United States to continue to manage risk to its national interests by maintaining credible fighting, and thus, deterrent forces.

As a second step in the evolutionary process, the United States should develop new strategic and operational concepts, conditioned by technological feasibility, for the application of U.S. military power in the 21st century. The concepts must provide the basis for determining the military capabilities the nation will require. Those capabilities should not be mere extrapolations of currently fielded systems but must represent a "leap ahead" in the nature of the U.S. armed forces. Focused science and technology and research development initiatives must be taken within the next few years if the United States is to field the military capabilities it will need in the second and third decades of the 21st century.

As fielding of the new force is completed, the Joint Vision 2010 force should progressively be transferred to the Reserve Components. Those legacy systems will be required to consummate victory in the event of major regional warfare. In that regard, the Reserve Components will be the ultimate guarantors of U.S. vital interests. Additionally, the Reserve Components will have to focus on interoper-

ability and rationalization with allies and potential coalition partners.

The anticipated speed of active force deployments and operations will require that Reserve Component units have readiness levels very close to those of active forces. The most readily deployable reserve component units must be capable of deployment within as little as 10 days versus the current 90-day requirement. Follow-on units will have to be capable of deployment within correspondingly shorter periods of time. Reserve units requiring 90-270 days to deploy will be of limited utility.

Evolving concepts feature "high-tech" Active Component units capable of operating in enemy territory within 72-96 hours of a political decision. Striking swiftly at multiple critical points, their function is to prevent coherent resistance as their carefully orchestrated precision maneuver and attacks induce paralysis and confusion. Follow-on Active and Reserve Component forces will secure victory and set the stage for post-hostility operations, while the ultra-high technology Active Component forces recover and reconstitute.

Increased reliance on the Reserve Components in future conflict will be feasible for several reasons. First, the variables of the warning-mobilization-response equation can be manipulated to guarantee adequate Reserve Component response. Specifically, information technology must be coupled with a robust intelligence network to increase significantly the quantity and quality of strategic warning. Twenty-first century intelligence capabilities, enhanced by information technology, will be able to render strategic surprise by an opponent a very rare occurrence.

At the same time, mobilization time-lines can be shortened substantially through technological advances leading to quantum improvements in training effectiveness and efficiency and unprecedented industrial base agility. The Reserve Components will participate fully in a global network of integrated, interactive, ultra-high fidelity

mission simulators for equipment systems, units, and staff organizations. As a result, unprecedented individual, crew, unit, and staff levels of proficiency will be attainable and sustainable within the Reserve Components. Coupled with an industrial base that is sufficiently agile to immediately adjust to demands for all types of wartime commodities, the time from mobilization to combat effectiveness will be dramatically reduced.

Finally, new concepts in strategic mobility must be applied to get the heavy combat forces of the Reserve Components to the battlefield. While the new, asymmetric active forces will be largely self-deployable, the reserve forces will still require significant strategic transport. New modes of strategic lift, such as surface-skimming, wing-in-ground-effect or other heavy lift vessels capable of deploying large, bulky units in days rather than weeks, are feasible and will be required to meet 21st century strategic agility requirements.

In summary, it is clear that the U.S. military must break free from the post-Cold War mind-set and embark upon a process of change that will provide the nation with the forces it will need in the early decades of the 21st century. The strategic plan outlined above for guiding the U.S. armed forces through this period of evolutionary change is taking form in the minds of many national security strategists. Its elements are beginning to appear in various military planning documents. As the plan becomes more coherent and defense leaders realize that now is the season to begin its implementation, the systematic evolution of the U.S. armed forces will gather momentum. The present challenge is to coalesce efforts into a coherent process of change.

The Future and the Army After Next: A Contextual Framework for the Future

William J. Doll

In all futures scenarios, the only constant is change. The most notable characteristic of change is acceleration. There is no evidence that this will change in either the short or the long term. In the future, change will result from the instant accumulation and transfer of information processed into applicable knowledge at an exponential rate. Furthermore, this dynamic is asymmetric; it will not happen equally in all disciplines or within all socio-economic strata.

While technology is the driving force of change, much of the substantive change will be in how technology is applied to society and how society responds. Changing values within society will accommodate some changes and will reject others. This aspect of change is very complex and clouds the future more than any other single dynamic. If application of change is asymmetric to global society, acceptance is asymmetric by an order of magnitude in any given field of human endeavor. As change accelerates, the orders of magnitude increase. Further complicating this process are the various cultures imbedded in nations, tribes, groups and organizations. The clash may be between civilizations, but it may also take place at much lower, yet very troublesome, levels. An example here is that while global communications spread English as the singular international language, there will be a stronger effort by countries and diasporic enclaves to reinforce native languages as an element of national identity. Indeed, a future paradox in broadcast media is that while it fuels globalization, local and national media will strengthen their positions to protect both cultural heritage and national interests. Thus while change is no longer constrained by geography, culture is no longer protected by it.

Organizations, frames of reference, and values developed in the latter part of this millennium will not

survive very far into the next. Politics and economics are going to be vastly renovated over the next 50 years and beyond. Structures that served mass industrial societies will be overcome by the empowerment of individuals who will have more input into policy formation and management just as they will in consumer choice. Structures that pushed from the top down will be replaced by those that pull from the bottom up. This could lead to a number of paradoxes. For example, economics will push national disintegration at the same time that nationalism is on the rise; and while groups seek increased autonomy on the one hand, regions will be forming strong economic alliances on the other. While these phenomena are not diametrically opposed, it will be very difficult to resolve the problems they pose at a time when accumulating knowledge and resulting change are occurring simultaneously and rapidly.

Demographics will change on a global scale, impacting what we do, where we live, and who we are as a people and how we manifest that individually. Some populations will not only age, they will have declining replacements. Others, in the less affluent areas of the globe, will become younger. Before 2025, every nation in Europe will be into a state of population decline. Some nations, like Italy, will show a negative growth rate. The Middle East, however, will undergo a population upsurge. Asymmetric growth patterns will also occur within cultures, such as the expanding male populations now appearing in India and China. Such imbalances may manifest themselves as major social problems in only a few generations. Pressures for a sustainable environment will meet exploding populations with uncertain results. All of this will take place in a world that is in constant communication with itself.

The 21st century will be the biological century. Genetic engineering, DNA splicing, and cloning provide scary but very real possibilities to address a range of problems, challenges and moral issues. There is even a possibility that we may see the advent of DNA warfare.

One very positive application of genetic engineering and application is in the field of environmentalism. It may be far easier and less painful to clean up the environmental legacy left by the industrial age if biological processes are used.

Security problems are going to be far more complex. Solutions will demand creative and asymmetrical approaches. Electronics can empower very small groups, even individuals, with options once reserved for nation-states. Military power will be measured by results as much as by the number of troops, tanks, divisions, planes, wings, ships, and fleets a nation or group has at its disposal. In fact, large standing forces may have little if any application in many cases where small groups of terrorists use cyberspace to promote their agendas. Similarly, traditional military forces will find it difficult dealing with the effects of major shifts in the social and cultural paradigm, such as an aging population. Change, and how nations, groups, and individuals cope with it, will be the challenge for us all in the 21st century.

The State of the Army After Next

Douglas V. Johnson II

The culture in which we live and work looks to the future in very short segments. Each year, every military unit examines its budget as it plans for the coming year. The Department of Defense lives by the Program Objective Memorandum (POM) cycle and looks just a little beyond that for purposes of sorting through what will be a part of the next POM. But the Army After Next (AAN) will not be America's Army until today's lieutenants and junior captains are the entrenched leadership. Meanwhile, how does the Army, tasked for readiness in the present while justifying its programs for tomorrow, look out to 2020 and beyond? This is not an easy thing for any institution to do, especially one as programmatically configured and conditioned as the U.S. Army.

Nevertheless, the Army is looking to the future with uncharacteristic energy and sharpened focus. According to the Chief of Staff, Army, Force XXI is the process of changing from today to Army XXI and to the Army After Next. A three-stage process for moving toward the distant future is taking shape: from Force XXI—which is today's Army plus digitized appliques, through Army XXI—the significantly improved Army of 2010, to the Army After Next. The latter, the AAN, should be a truly different force, one incorporating as much of the technological and organizational innovations generated by the revolution in military affairs as can be budgeted and digested over the next quarter century or so.

This process is at once reassuring and deceptive. While it prescribes a course for long-term investments in research and development, it also assumes a willingness to change that will require moving away from established and trusted concepts that have undergirded our doctrine and training since before the end of the Vietnam War. Also, while futurists are speculating about the shape of things to come,

we really cannot know with any degree of certainty the shape of the strategic environment 30 years from now.

Investments in research and development (R&D) are based on the ability to field systems at a specified stage of development and to be operational by a certain date as determined by an established funding cycle. But if the Army really does want to think ahead—"out of the box"—it should adopt a frame of mind which allows it to try some things which may, on first consideration, appear far-fetched. Some things we think of as remotely possible in 2025 may, in fact, be just around the corner.

The first Army After Next wargame, conducted at the Army War College's Center for Strategic Leadership in late January and early February 1997, pitted Army XXI units plus a very advanced AAN battle force, against a not quite as capable, but very large foe on the plains of south central Europe. In this game, AAN "tanks" flew at 200 miles per hour. They operated over a battlefield some 2,500 square miles in area, and moved 1,000 miles between fuelings. Using their electromagnetic guns with a 10 kilometer first shot kill capability, these tanks dispatched advanced versions of current tanks, still the backbone of the enemy force, with ease.

After some reflection and objective analyses, the initial euphoria fostered by these kinds of capabilities was reined in a bit. The next AAN wargame, conducted last September, was more realistic as it embarked on a slightly different approach. The setting changed to a South Asian nation embroiled with a "quasi-insurgency" against a highly sophisticated, almost cyber-enemy. Gone were people in black pajamas using rusty rifles and punji sticks. In came cyber-guerrillas who proved as adept at zapping computers as they were at devising weapons of mass destruction. While flying tanks had little utility in such a setting, the need for faster vehicles was clearly evident. In the end, the AAN carried the day due to the employment of its spectacularly capable Special Operations Forces.

Whether fighting advanced versions of current tanks with 200 mile-per-hour flying tanks or zapping it out with cyber-guerrillas in South Asia, both games demonstrated the absolute centrality of communications as well as their vulnerabilities. During the first game, the enemy destroyed the Global Positioning Satellite (GPS) system. In the second game the GPS was distorted through electronic attack and manipulation. In any event, our focus on the strategic vulnerabilities of digitization is a key corollary to the Army After Next.

This year, the game may well begin with a war already in progress. Undoubtedly, new things will be learned from this game and new concepts tested to the extent of our reasoned, future capabilities. It is important to the AAN process that we institutionalize a sense of innovation, even a propensity for taking risks. If we do, then the leadership 30 years from now will be properly prepared for having already encountered a wide range of possibilities in wargames throughout their careers.

The AAN will result from an ongoing series of investigations. As we proceed, we cannot—indeed we will not—always know what will work at any given time. Also, unexpected and unintended synergies will emerge and we may well find ourselves proceeding along paths that are not currently anticipated. As the AAN becomes a reality, we will find that some technologies, like the electromagnetic gun, are not likely to be fielded by 2025. While hovering tanks may not be available for the AAN, by combining emerging technologies and adapting concepts to maximize their potential, we can begin to examine new kinds of fighting vehicles. It is possible that a 10-15 ton armored combat vehicle (ACV), propelled by a hybrid electric engine, could be a part of the AAN. This ACV may well look like a cross between the French Renault tank of the 1960s, the German Puma armored car, and the Marine Corps' "Grizzly." Being lightly armored, it would have to rely on the kind of battlefield situational awareness we are currently developing for Force XXI as it accomplishes its

missions while staying out of the way of direct fire. Such an ACV could move about by virtue of a variety of lift systems that may, indeed, allow it to fly.

While flying ACVs may seem far-fetched today, it is not farfetched for us to think about them. We should probably be thinking about the possibility of 200 miles-per-hour tanks as well because, while these will may not be a part of the armored units of 2025, they probably will be the focus of development by then. In any event, now is the time to test for the practical and the impractical to avoid wasting the limited resources at our disposal, including that most calculable and limited of all resources, time. After all, preparing for the future is what forward thinking militaries do in interwar periods.

Trends and Issues.

- As the Army assists DoD in moving beyond the post-Cold War era, Army leadership must employ a credible process for determining force requirements that takes into account—but does not rely exclusively on—the overlapping major theater war criterion. Force requirements must be based on opportunities to shape the international security environment as well as on the need to hedge against possible major theater war.
- The draft Army Strategic Planning Guidance suggests that the Army is crafting a coherent process for transitioning to a 21st century force. That process may be adaptable generally by the Department of Defense. Whether change will be viewed as revolutionary by some and evolutionary by others is irrelevant so long as a practicable process of real change directed toward a timely and identifiable future force is implemented.
- Regarding counter- and anti-terrorism, the Army must assist DoD in more precisely defining its roles,

vis-à-vis other government agencies. Once DoD has clarified its roles, the Army will be better able to describe its domestic and international capacities to defeat terrorism.

- Just as the Army played a major role in defining and establishing "jointness," it must lead DoD beyond the concept of joint warfare into fully integrated capabilities and operations.
- The Army should support the disestablishment of the U.S. Atlantic Command and the establishment of a new "Joint Forces Command." The Army, however, must ensure that the responsibilities of the new command *vis-à-vis* those of the CJCS, the Services, and the combatant commands are clearly defined and accepted.
- The Army should assist DoD in defining its role in providing for the common defense of key U.S. information systems. If, as several knowledgeable observers have stated, an "information Pearl Harbor" is both possible and imminent, the time is now for DoD and the Army to decide upon the scope of their information operations and responsibilities.
- Change will manifest itself exponentially in the 21st century.
- Biotechnology will pose as many security problems as it will ethical and moral problems.
- As we proceed toward the Army After Next, we must maintain an acuity of mind that allows us to explore even far-fetched ideas. In some cases, technologies we think may be far off are really at hand.
- The Army After Next is now a process defined and refined by a series of wargames and conferences. It should become an on-going process so that in 2025 the

AAN will be looking out to the Army of 2050 and beyond.

SECTION II

THE QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW AND THOUGHTS ON THE NATIONAL DEFENSE PANEL REPORT

Quadrennial Defense Review

William T. Johnsen

The Armed Forces Structure Review Act of 1996 (known familiarly as the Lieberman Amendment) required the Secretary of Defense to complete the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) within 1997. The act also stipulated that the QDR must include:

... a comprehensive examination of the defense strategy, force structure, force modernization plans, infrastructure, and other elements of the defense program and policies with a view toward determining and expressing the defense strategy of the United States and establishing a revised defense program through the year 2005.

Secretary of Defense Cohen issued the congressionally-mandated report on the QDR in May 1997.

Report on the QDR.

The QDR was a collaborative effort between the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff, and included considerable consultation with the Military Departments and the Commanders-in-Chief of the Combatant Commands (CINCs). By and large, the report hewed to Secretary Cohen's pledge that the review would be a "strategy driven" assessment, rather than a budget cutting exercise.

The report provided the Department of Defense (DoD) view of the future international security environment. While noting general overall improvements in security

conditions, the report concluded “nevertheless, the world remains a dangerous and highly uncertain place, and the United States likely will face a number of significant challenges to its security between now and 2015.” (p. 3) The report identified five primary risks:

- Regional dangers ranging from would-be regional hegemony to instability generated by failing or failed states.
- Proliferation of sensitive information and technology—especially nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons and their means of delivery.
- Transnational dangers, such as illegal drug trade or organized crime.
- Threats to the United States and its citizens through terrorism or information warfare.
- Adversaries are likely to pursue asymmetric means that attempt to circumvent U.S. strengths and attack perceived vulnerabilities.

More positively, the report notes that the United States currently does not face a “global peer competitor” and is not anticipated to face one through 2015. The report also concludes that the United States will remain politically and militarily engaged around the globe and will maintain its current military superiority over potential rivals.

The QDR also lays out a new defense strategy for protecting and promoting U.S. national interests. Noting that the United States can neither afford to retreat into isolation nor become the “world’s policeman,” the United States will continue to pursue a national security strategy of engagement. Where possible, the United States will act with allies; when required it will act unilaterally. Three major elements of the strategy—**shaping** the international environment, **responding** to the full spectrum of crises,

and **preparing** *now* for an uncertain future—seek to protect and promote U.S. national interests around the globe.

Shaping will be accomplished in a number of ways. The United States will promote regional stability through bilateral and multilateral relationships that build confidence with allies and partners, as well as improve transparency in security issues. Forces overseas, peacetime engagement activities, and preventive measures (such as, constraining or eliminating NBC capabilities, arms control regimes, and the prevention or deterrence of terrorism) will help prevent or reduce conflicts and threats. U.S. conventional and nuclear capabilities will help deter aggression and coercion.

Responding to the full spectrum of crises includes deterring aggression and coercion in crises. This may entail a declaratory U.S. commitment or employing U.S. forces in a limited manner to convey U.S. concern. If these limited options are not successful, the United States may find it necessary to intervene militarily. These smaller-scale contingencies (encompassing the full range of operations beyond peacetime engagement activities, but short of major theater war) seek swiftly to contain, mitigate, or terminate a conflict before it expands. Responding also includes fighting and winning major theater wars (MTWs) "... in two distant theaters in overlapping time frames," (p. 12)

Preparing will be accomplished by pursuing a focused modernization effort that ensures that forces and equipment are prepared for the changing conditions of the international security environment. This modernization effort must exploit the "revolution in military affairs (RMA)," as well as the "revolution in business affairs," that is transforming the future conduct of warfare. Finally, to hedge against "wild card" scenarios or other unanticipated threats, the DoD must pursue broad research and development efforts that take full advantage of emerging technologies.

To achieve these goals will require a "full spectrum force" possessing sufficient size and capability "... to defeat large enemy conventional forces, deter aggression and coercion, and conduct the full range of smaller-scale contingencies and shaping activities, all in the face of asymmetric challenges." Such a force also will "... require a balanced mix of overseas presence and power projection capabilities" (p. 16), as well as a number of critical enablers: quality people, a globally vigilant intelligence system, global communications, superiority in space, and control of the seas and airspace.

The QDR examined three alternative paths to implementing the defense strategy:

- Path 1: Focus on near-term demands;
- Path 2: Prepare for a more distant threat [post-2015]; and,
- Path 3: Balance current demands and an uncertain future.

Not surprisingly, the report advocated Path 3.

In examining personnel levels and force structures needed to meet current demands, the QDR advocated cutting 176,500 active, reserve, and civilian positions, a 5.6 percent reduction from the FY 1997 programmed force. With the exception of attack submarines and surface combatants, the report proposed no real reductions in conventional force structure. Nuclear forces will be retained at START I levels until the Russian Duma ratifies START II, and then U.S. nuclear forces will reduce to START II levels.

After these reductions the Armed Forces would retain the following structures:

Army: Active Component forces would consist of four corps, ten divisions, and two armored cavalry regiments. The Reserve Components would reduce the traditional

strategic reserve and would transition better to support combat operations.

Navy: The Navy would retain 12 carrier battle groups and 12 amphibious ready groups, as well as 10 active and 1 reserve aircraft wings. Surface combatants would be reduced from 128 to 116, and attack submarines would be reduced from 73-50.

USAF: Modest reductions in total aircraft (60) and restructuring would result in 12 active and 8 reserve fighter wings and 4 reserve air defense squadrons. 187 bombers would be retained.

USMC: The Marine Corps would remain fundamentally unchanged, retaining three Marine Expeditionary Forces.

To prepare for an uncertain future, the QDR advocates achieving the operational concepts outlined in *Joint Vision 2010*: information superiority, dominant maneuver, precision engagement, full-dimensional protection, and focused logistics. To turn these operational concepts into reality will require concrete capabilities. While many of these capabilities exist in the current force, it will be necessary to modernize forces to prepare for the uncertainties of the future security environment. To achieve modernization goals, DoD has set a target of \$60 billion per year shortly after the turn of the century for modernization programs. Within these limits, the DoD will focus on information technology and command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities (C⁴ISR). This will also result in reduced production of tactical aircraft, as well as V-22 Osprey tilt-rotor aircraft, but only will stop production on B-2 bombers. Modernization of the Navy's carrier force will proceed as planned. The Army will accelerate fielding of its "digitized" Army XXI corps, as well the Army National Guard Division Redesign. Lastly, theater ballistic missile, national missile, and cruise missile defenses will remain a priority within the DoD.

The QDR envisages savings in infrastructure costs as the primary means for generating the funds needed to underwrite DoD's modernization priorities. These savings are to be obtained through a reduction of roughly 109,000 civilian and military positions within the DoD infrastructure base, two additional future rounds of Base Realignment and Closings (BRAC), improved efficiency and performance by "reengineering" or "reinventing" DoD support functions, and by outsourcing functions to private industry and organizations.

The report was immediately subjected to criticism from all sides—Congress, private scholars and think tanks, officials from past administrations, and from the Army Reserve Components. The standard criticism is that the report failed to respond adequately to the changed international security environment. But, once again, the criticism came from all points of the analytical and political compass. In the (many) minds of critics, the QDR failed to, *inter alia*: acknowledge the changed security environment and cut "excess" force structure, close the current resource-missions mismatch to prevent a future "hollow force," or provide adequate funding for future modernization. Conversely, other groups charged that the document went too far. Congress, for example, reacted strongly to the QDR's recommendation for two more rounds of base closings, as well as recommendations for increased privatization or outsourcing. Critics inside and outside of Congress charged that the QDR cut force structures and personnel beyond what is needed to maintain the current pace of operations. Recommendations for reductions and reorganization of Reserve Component force structures unleashed a storm of interest group reaction.

In some ways, the widespread criticism could indicate that perhaps the Department of Defense "got it about right." In other words, if it made nearly everyone angry, then it must have made tough choices. This conclusion is reinforced by the National Defense Panel's (NDP) generally positive assessment of the QDR. Although the NDP

criticized aspects of the QDR and its recommendations (emphasizing for instance, tighter linkages between strategy and program decisions and priorities, taking greater advantage of opportunities perceived in the RMA, addressing risks posed by transnational threats, improving better computer modeling and simulations technology, and overcoming inadequate modernization resources), the NDP did not express strong disagreement with the QDR results. In fact, the NDP seconded QDR recommendations for cutting defense infrastructure, refining DoD business practices, base realignment and closings, and privatization of services whenever practicable.

At the time of this writing, Congress has deferred taking significant action on the QDR, save for voicing strong opposition to two key recommendations: calls for two more rounds of base realignment and closings and increased privatization of depot functions. Congressional activity is likely to remain muted until Congress has time to digest the NDP Report, *Transforming Defense: National Security in the 21st Century*, which it received in mid-December 1997.

Congressional interest in dissonance between the QDR and the NDP reports is high. NDP members are testifying before key Congressional panels as of this writing, and key DoD recommendations from the QDR are likely to be scrutinized closely during upcoming budget hearings. Moreover, current Congressional interest in defense reform issues is likely to remain high.

On the other hand, 1998 will be a busy year for Congress. In defense issues, alone, Congress will be considering NATO expansion, the extension of U.S. military participation in Bosnia, and the continuing possibility of military confrontation with Iraq. Moreover, 1998 is an election year and other issues, such as Social Security, Medicare and other medical reforms may preoccupy Congress for much of the year.

Given its long-standing interests in defense matters and the high expectations placed on the QDR and NDP,

Congress may undertake significant action to restructure DoD, the Military Departments, or the force structures of the respective Services. And, like the Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization Act of 1986, Congressional action and attendant consequences could have long-range implications for DoD and its future force structures.

On the other hand, there is a danger that the QDR could devolve into a spasm of activity that takes place every four years rather than stimulating a continuous evaluation of the issues specified in the legislation. This is not to recommend that the level of activity that has accompanied the QDR and the NDP should be sustained over a 4-year period. To the contrary, that level of activity and resources would likely be counterproductive to the long-term security interests of the nation. Instead, the QDR process should be incorporated into the routine planning processes that guide the development of strategy and the force structures and programs needed to turn those concepts into reality. Secretary Cohen's Defense Reform Initiative and other Department of Defense reforms and studies suggest progress toward that goal.

The Report of the National Defense Panel

William T. Johnsen

The legislation that called for the QDR also established a National Defense Panel (NDP) of security experts outside the DoD to conduct an independent review of the QDR, as well as to examine a broad range of security issues. Specifically, the panel was charged with identifying potential threats: conventional, weapons of mass destruction, vulnerability of U.S. technology, and terrorism. Based on these threats, the panel would then develop possible scenarios. Finally, the panel was charged to "develop recommendations regarding a variety of force structures for the Armed Forces that permit the forward deployment of sufficient land- and sea-based forces to provide an effective deterrent to conflict and to permit military response by the United States to scenarios."

The NDP submitted its report to Secretary Cohen on December 1, 1997. Secretary Cohen forwarded the report, along with his comments, to Congress on December 15, 1997. The NDP Report contains a considerable number of conclusions and recommendations for DoD action or consideration. Length constraints, however, restrict discussion to only the most pertinent points.

The World in 2020. The panel concluded that, despite clear improvements in the international security environment, the United States will continue to face traditional security risks. Additionally, adversaries will find new and innovative ways to challenge U.S. national interests. Specifically, the panel noted adversaries will attempt to circumvent U.S. capabilities and exploit perceived U.S. weaknesses. Opponents also may target allies, overseas bases, defense installations, and even domestic communities and internal defense infrastructure. Adversaries will seek ways to negate U.S. power projection capabilities. Current U.S. information dominance may present a potential vulnerability. U.S. reliance on space-

based operations poses a similar dilemma. Operations in an urban environment, where an opponent can negate long-range, precision strike capabilities while increasing U.S. casualties, may present a particular challenge. Finally, there are the threats presented by proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and increased potential for their use within the United States.

National Security Challenges. The panel recognized the need, for the time being, to meet the threats in Northeast and Southwest Asia. However, it describes DoD's current two Major Theater War (MTW) concept "... as a force sizing function, not a strategy... [that]... is fast becoming an inhibitor to reaching the capabilities we will need in the 2010-2020 time frame." (p. 23) Instead of "the current posture [which] minimizes near-term risk at a time when danger is moderate to low," the panel urges the DoD to examine:

- Homeland defense (against nuclear attack, terrorism, information warfare, ballistic and cruise missiles, transnational threats, and attacks on critical infrastructure),
- Promoting regional stability (by relying less on military power and more on integration of all elements of national power, especially diplomacy; use of alliances and coalitions; and prevention of regional instability),
- Projecting military power (more rapidly, absent significant forward access, with smaller units and footprints, with greater lethality, and with the ability to conduct effective urban operations),
- Space operations,
- Maintaining U.S. information superiority, and
- Weapons of mass destruction.

Force Capabilities. The panel's recommendations concerning force capabilities are based on the premise that we are on the cusp of a revolution in military affairs (RMA). The panel argues, therefore, that "current force structures and information architectures extrapolated into the future may not suffice to meet successfully the conditions of future battle." This critical assumption bears brief examination.

First, even if one accepts the emergence of an RMA (and this is an open question), there is no reason why the United States cannot lead that revolution. At present, the United States is on the cutting edge of many of the technological advances currently underway or under examination. Few significant competitors are on the horizon. A breakthrough in technology may occur that would give an opponent an edge, but that advantage is likely to be temporary, in a narrow band of military capabilities, and a small risk.

Second, as the panel underscores, opponents could use asymmetric approaches to circumvent U.S. RMA strengths and capabilities. The only way that such an effort could succeed is if the United States becomes complacent or misdirects its defense expenditures. But, the United States already recognizes that pitfall and can avoid such an outcome. Moreover, this is not a problem that can be resolved by overhauling the defense establishment: inadequate concern can occur even if the United States adopts all the panel's recommendations.

Whether the United States may be surpassed in an RMA may not be, therefore, the critical point. Instead, the United States must choose carefully to avoid locking into technology too soon or pursuing a dead end. Such decisions always have been made, and will be required whether or not we are on the cusp of an RMA. Thus, the more critical issue is properly framing questions, thorough analysis, and effective decisionmaking.

To realize the potential inherent in the RMA, the panel urges DoD to place greater emphasis on: systems architecture, information systems protection, information

operations, automation, small logistics footprint, mobility, stealth, speed, extended operational and strike ranges, and precision strike. This will require shifting funds from planned acquisitions (so-called "legacy" systems) to new systems focused on 2010-20. Equally, the panel emphasizes directed energy, electromagnetic energy, and cyber-weapons. Ballistic and cruise missile defense systems, as well as other defenses against WMD, also deserve priority.

More specifically for the Army, the panel argues that land forces must:

- Become more expeditionary: fast, shock-exploiting forces, with greater urban operations capability;
- Reduce systems that are difficult to move and support; shift to lighter, more agile automated systems;
- Evolve to lighter, greater range, more lethal fire-support systems;
- Develop the 21st century tank to be a unique vehicle relying on speed, agility, and hyper-velocity gun technology for operational effectiveness;
- Move beyond Force XXI to incorporate the concepts embodied in Army After Next;
- Restructure above-the-line units, which evolve to smaller operational elements with equivalent (or greater) lethality;
- More toward advanced vertical lift systems versus service-life extensions of current rotary-wing aircraft.

The panel devotes considerable discussion to the future role of the Reserve Components. The panel notes that the Reserves and National Guard will be needed in future operations, and must be prepared and fully integrated with the Active Components. This will require a considerable

reorientation of the Army National Guard, in particular, as well as a healing of the rift between the Active Army and the National Guard. How these critical initiatives are to be achieved largely is left unsaid, although one specific recommendation is for DoD to establish funding priorities for specific Guard and Reserve programs, rather than the current practice of letting Congress determine funding priorities.

National Guard divisional combat and combat support units should be assigned to Active Component divisions and brigades. Moreover, enhanced National Guard brigades would report to Active Component commanders. The panel also recommends that the Guard identify battalion-sized units that would deploy early and join Active Component counterparts in operations. While the Guard would provide a smaller strategic reserve, those units would have a clear peacetime mission. The panel recommends that the Guard assume the entire U.S. Army South mission.

Homeland defense would take on greater significance, with the National Guard assuming many current and emerging roles. The National Guard would continue to provide general purpose forces for prompt support to civil authorities. They also would train civil agencies charged with responding to civil emergencies, as well as provide immediate reinforcement of first response efforts. Where possible, Guard forces would perform new missions associated with homeland defense (e.g., national missile defense).

A Transformation Strategy. The panel recognizes that to effect its recommendations will require the DoD to develop and execute a transformation strategy. Specifically, the panel calls for moving to a broader approach to national security, including a revision of the National Security Act of 1947 and the existing security architecture which may not meet the conditions of the new century, *inter alia*: space, cyberspace, and information. The panel also calls for shifting the intelligence structure to meet the more

disparate threats to U.S. interests likely in the new environment, while protecting and exploiting the capabilities inherent in the information revolution. This will include merging and integrating existing and future technologies, eliminating bureaucratic barriers (both internal and external to the United States), improving capabilities for technical intelligence gathering, and, perhaps most importantly, “. . . revitalizing human intelligence (HUMINT) to include the need for military personnel with extensive regional knowledge and language skills.” (p. 65)

The panel calls for sweeping changes in the interagency process. The panel recommends adding the Secretary of the Treasury and the Attorney General to the statutory members of the National Security Council. It also calls for establishing “...an interagency cadre of professionals, including civilian and military officers, whose purpose would be to staff key positions in the national security structures” (p. 66), a body loosely akin to the Joint Staff.

The panel also urges DoD to institutionalize innovation, experimentation, and change. For the Army, the more significant recommendations include shifting many of the Army's ongoing success stories into the joint arena: Joint Battle Lab headquarters, Joint National Training Centers, a Joint Urban Warfare Center, a Joint Concept Development Center, and a Joint Forces Command to monitor and report on joint exercises, their results, and their implications.

The panel calls for considerable revision of the Unified Command Plan. That being said, the recommendations would have little concrete effect on the Army; therefore discussion of this topic is omitted.

Recommendations within the NDP Report for transforming the industrial base and defense infrastructure break little new ground. Essentially, they echo previous calls from within and without DoD. Generally, the panel supports infrastructure initiatives currently

underway or outlined in the QDR or Secretary Cohen's Defense Reform Initiative. Panel members seconded, or called for more sweeping implementation of outsourcing, competitive bidding between private and government facilities, and two BRAC rounds to be conducted earlier than recommended in the QDR Report. They also called for new legislation that would allow more flexible distribution of funds.

Secretary Cohen's Comments on the NDP Report.

As required under the enabling legislation, Secretary of Defense Cohen provided his comments on the NDP's *Report to Congress*. In many instances, he strongly endorsed the panel's recommendations, particularly in areas of reforming business practices, generating savings, acquisition reforms, and additional base closures (although Secretary Cohen adhered to the QDR Report's 2001 and 2005 target dates).

Secretary Cohen acknowledged the need to improve current power projection capabilities, and develop new ones as technology allows, albeit not always endorsing specific recommendations. Secretary Cohen also shared the panel's concerns over space platforms and capabilities, as well as the need to prepare for operations in an urban environment. He endorsed the panel's recommendations concerning a national missile defense system.

The Secretary offered to examine—rather than act on—a wide range of the panel's recommendations. For example, he indicated DoD would examine the panel's comments about the inconsistency of Service visions and procurement plans, as well as furthering "jointness." He also agreed with the need to better integrate the Active and Reserve Components, but stopped short of accepting specific recommendations. On the issue of homeland defense, he reported that the Under-Secretary of the Army had directed an Active-Reserve "Tiger Team" to develop a plan for

responding to domestic WMD attacks, and underscored DoD actions already underway in this key area.

Secretary Cohen's most open disagreement with the panel surrounds its recommendation concerning the two MTW force sizing criteria. His extensive response bears repeating:

I believe the panel incorrectly characterizes our approach to sizing military forces. Contrary to the panel's characterization, we size our forces against a range of requirements, not only to fight and win major theater wars. In fact, for many elements of our forces, the requirements for major theater war are less demanding than for day-to-day peacetime activities. This has been demonstrated by recent experience and by analyses conducted during the QDR. In accordance with our strategy, our force structure is designed to meet three broad requirements: to provide adequate overseas presence and conduct a wide range of peacetime activities that promote peace and stability in key regions; to conduct the full range of smaller-scale contingencies; and, in concert with allies, to deter and defeat large-scale, cross-border aggression in two distant theaters in overlapping time frames. The force outlined in the QDR provides the capabilities necessary to meet these requirements. (p. 3)

Congressional Reaction to the NDP.

Congressional reaction, as one might expect, covers the spectrum. As Senator Dan Coates (R-IN) told *Defense Daily* (December 3, 1997), "There will be some who say that it hasn't gone far enough. Others will say it has gone too far. But [the NDP is] precipitating the debate and [the report is] an invaluable tool for Congress and the defense establishment to determine how we're going to invest our resources."

Congressional reaction to the NDP Report could have been much stronger. Quite simply, the panel failed to address many of the fundamental issues stipulated by the Lieberman Amendment. Most critically, it did not provide alternative force structures to those presented by DoD in the QDR Report. In the panel's defense, it was given a task

probably beyond its reach. But, the panel should have acknowledged that circumstance and called for further efforts to refine alternative force structures. At the least, it should have commented on the force structures contained in the QDR Report.

Despite the efforts of the QDR and the NDP, therefore, the debates over the future force structures of the U.S. Armed Forces have not been completed. One hopes that this debate will be rejoined quickly to address the critical issues facing U.S. national security strategy.

SECTION III

TRANSREGIONAL SECURITY FORECAST

Europe

Thomas-Durell Young

Regional Assessment.

The most defining and public event in European security in 1997 was the announcement at the NATO Madrid Summit in July that three countries (Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary) would be invited to begin accession negotiations to join NATO. Membership expansion now turns to the question of the outlook for ratification, i.e., whether 16 parliaments will approve the accession of these three nations. Russian displeasure with membership expansion was offset by the signing of the Founding Act between Moscow and the Alliance formalizing a bilateral consultative relationship. The continuation of the export of the Occident's legacy of Greek philosophy and Roman law to Central and Eastern Europe proceeds.

Notwithstanding the justifiably important and long-term aspects of this decision by NATO, in reality, European political and public attention continues to be consumed by low economic growth and unprecedented rates of unemployment in most Western European countries. Although growth in the past 2 years in principal continental countries shows signs of recovery, much of it has been limited to certain sectors and has had little impact upon unemployment. Moreover, due to almost unmovable cultural and political obstacles, efforts to effect greater competitiveness in these economies have not met with widespread success.

Western European governments have been impeded in responding to these economic difficulties in traditional

Keynesian means by an almost religious zeal to meet strict fiscal guidelines to enable them to join the European Monetary Union in 1999. In effect, countries have established an imperative of not being "left behind" (and relegated to second class status) in this latest effort to achieve closer economic integration in the European Union (EU). EU member governments are therefore confronted with the domestic political imperative to fund generous (by U.S. standards) social welfare and unemployment transfers (during a period of economic downturn in most key European countries) while finding budgetary savings to meet the Maastricht guidelines. EU membership expansion will also place either additional financial burdens on states, or cause major political difficulties should EU states attempt to reform current transfer policies to member states.

It should come as no surprise that EU defense ministers have had little success in their attempts to maintain, let alone increase, funding for defense. European defense ministers continue to see their budgets come under assault from cash-strapped governments, which has slowed reorganization and reequipment of forces the better to enable them to project military power outside of traditional areas of operation. The lack of money, and more particularly political will on the part of France, have also combined to inhibit the restructuring and rationalization of the continent's defense industry. The recent moves by NATO to strengthen the "European Pillar" within its structures has had the welcome benefit of obviating against the need for creating duplicative structures within the EU during this period of economic downturn.

Compounding this pessimist outlook for Western European armed forces has been the stress placed on units and operations budgets due to continuing deployments to Bosnia-Herzegovina through participation in the NATO Stabilization Force. As SFOR will be extended beyond its current mandate, the drain on the operations and maintenance budgets of NATO defense forces will continue.

Two issues in NATO require mention. Progress continues to proceed at a snail's pace in the Alliance's ambitious attempt to effect "internal adaption" via the Long-Term Study (LTS). LTS has had two principal objectives. First, the Alliance has met with limited success in its efforts to reorganize its large integrated command structure. The latter failure is due in large part to the simple fact that the integrated command structure was not created by one simple act but rather through a painstaking evolutionary process which has indeed resulted in some rather unusual command arrangements. The December 1997 Defence Planning Committee decision to make some changes to the structure might be interpreted as a positive move; however, whether an ongoing headquarters manning study will support these changes is problematic at this juncture.

It should be no surprise that internal adaption has been so difficult given that nothing is agreed by nations until everything is agreed. In the interim, Spain's desire to join the integrated command structure was held hostage pending the resolution of disputes with Britain and Portugal over command arrangements in the Mediterranean and the Atlantic. France, on the other hand, continues to hold its own participation in the integrated command structure hostage to its demand that a European should be Commander-in-Chief Southern Region: a *demarche* which has failed to garner support even on the part of its European allies. There is little reason to find optimism that true internal adaption will be achieved any time in the near future, or that France will adopt a more constructive policy toward the Alliance.

Second, the LTS envisaged revising the military guidance to implement the Alliance's New Strategic Concept. This was achieved with the agreement to revise MC 400 in June 1996. Nonetheless, there is a growing consensus that the state of the strategic situation addressed by the New Strategic Concept in November 1991 has changed so radically that a new Alliance strategy is now

required. The terms of reference of such a new Alliance endeavor have yet to be finalized.

Notwithstanding concerted efforts on the part of the United States, Greece and Turkey continue to spar over the Aegean shelf, air and sea space, the reorganization of the NATO command structure in Southeast Europe, and Cyprus. These disputes continue to exert a negative impact upon the operation and reformation of NATO and have the potential of resulting in conflict.

Trends and Issues.

- Leadership in NATO will continue to be vital for continued efforts to achieve a lasting political settlement in Bosnia and the Balkans.
- The question of membership expansion in NATO shifts to national parliaments. Although approval by all 16 nations is likely, these debates could be difficult.
- Political disputes with Russia over the issue of membership enlargement will continue, notwithstanding the Founding Act.
- The LTS will continue in a deliberative manner and will dominate planning and restructuring efforts within the military arena of NATO.
- The debate of the French position as regards the restructuring of the integrated command structure will not appreciably change France's desire to continue its policy of "engagement" with NATO.
- The desire to achieve fiscal spending limits will continue to dominate the political agenda of most European Union member states.
- The European Union will continue to search, without success, for consensus over the issue of greater

integration, particularly as regards Common Foreign and Security Policy.

- Tensions between Greece and Turkey will continue to impede the conduct of business in NATO.

Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States

Stephen J. Blank

Regional Assessment.

Despite consistent efforts to recentralize and consolidate state power, the Russian state will remain unstable in 1998. Stability depends on the presence of President Boris Yeltsin, which confirms that Russia is today a government of men and not of laws. In no way can Russia be considered a truly democratic state, although progress away from totalitarianism has been made since 1991. Nevertheless, economic, political, and defense reform have stagnated partly because they have so far dealt with symptoms rather than fundamental causes. The government has relied on promises and efforts which can only be characterized as disingenuous in order to buy time and to look good to outsiders, particularly potential Western investors. The Russian state remains unaccountable to either laws or institutions and is, in effect, President Boris Yeltsin and Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin and a handful of other high officials.

Other influential personages in the Russian government include deputy prime ministers Anatoly Chubais and Boris Nemtsov without changing the fundamental fact that the Russian government is composed of highly personalized factions that consider themselves above and outside the law. These factions compete for political power and look for economic support among the banks and corporations like *Gazprom*. They also compete for support of the Russian armed forces as well as for that of the uncounted numbers of paramilitary and private militias in Russia. Finally, each faction competes for support of the media. What is developing looks like the Tsarist state in that it involves the privatization of state power through the medium of a semi-autocratic state.

Meanwhile, Russian leaders and elites still believe Russia must dominate the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) to remain a viable state and to stake its claim to great power status. Civilian and military elites, though often in disagreement over the nature of the threats to their national security, are united in more or less traditional paranoia about the intentions of most of the rest of the world. This world view imposes tremendous political, military, and economic burdens so that the state is saddled with a national security burden it cannot adequately address. Additionally, continuing poverty and the failure to accomplish military reform make it impossible to assert Moscow's hegemony over the CIS. While few, if any, of the states in the CIS have accomplished even the partial reforms undertaken in Russia, they are increasingly able to resist Moscow. In many cases, these states pursue independent foreign policies which bring foreign influences, particularly that of the United States, to bear in countering Russian efforts at hegemony. The CIS is now an area open to international competition. While NATO enlargement abets this trend, its main origins lie in the debility of Russia and the inherent weaknesses of the CIS. The presence of energy resources make this area one of strategic concern where political and international rivalry are to be expected in what is essentially a vacuum. In the year ahead, we can expect instability to continue along the southern periphery of Russia, to include a continuation of violence in the North Caucasus which Moscow has so far been unable to control or stop.

The military crisis will continue and reform cannot be evaded. Still, the government does not seem to be trying to create effective civilian control over the multiple armed forces throughout Russia. It is not fully committed to ending conscription, professionalizing the armed forces, and to modernization. For the foreseeable future Russia will continue to view the world as hostile and its military

will demand parity in everything with the United States, even though the government cannot make that a reality.

Trends and Issues.

- Russia's political turmoil will continue with Yeltsin and Chernomyrdin being the focal points of state power.
- While Russia will try to act like a world power, its only claim to world power status will be its aging and deteriorating nuclear arsenal.
- NATO enlargement will continue and Russian objections will also continue, but they will not affect the final result.
- The need for military reform will continue, but Russia will find itself institutionally unable to effect reform.
- Moscow will try to benefit at Washington's expense by interjecting itself into the confrontation between the United States and Iraq and by trying to expand its influence elsewhere in the Middle East.
- The rapprochement between Moscow and Beijing will continue with China being the primary beneficiary but Russia also gaining access to Asian arms markets.

Eastern Europe

Stephen J. Blank

Regional Assessment.

Several issues are prominent on the Central and East European security scene. Most of them revolve around the enlargement of NATO, and to a lesser degree the European Union, but the problems in the Balkans continue. In 1998, issues in the Balkans and Southeastern Europe will be among the most dangerous and urgent in the region.

In Southeastern Europe, the problems we face relate primarily to the failure to create viable states which can control violence and ameliorate the causes and effects of ethnic hatreds. Accordingly, the problem of failed or nonviable states, a perennial Balkan security challenge, will not be solved anytime soon. Therefore, since Balkan security is no longer separable from European security, we have to consider long-term structural and strategic challenges to regional security along with short-term tactical responses to local political as well as military challenges.

Throughout the former Yugoslavia, including Macedonia, ethnic tensions remain high as economic conditions will remain stagnant everywhere except in Croatia. Almost every local government is authoritarian to one degree or another, and all are based on a kind of vitriolic nationalism that perpetuates old ethnic and religious animosities. In Bosnia, the perpetual ethnic and political squabbling has forced the Stabilization Force (SFOR), whose deployment has been extended until at least 1999, to assume new powers. Meanwhile, there is increasing violence in Kosovo between the ruling Serbs and the restive Albanian population. The outbreak of full-scale conflict could easily spread to Albania or Macedonia or to other post-Yugoslav states.

In the coming year, the potential for an outbreak of violence in the Balkans will remain high. Should that happen, SFOR troops will be caught in the crossfire. While casualties, including those of Americans would be one result, another reality is that NATO enlargement remains hostage to the success of SFOR. If SFOR fails, the Dayton Accords fail, and NATO enlargement could be a casualty. NATO will be seen as having failed in its only military endeavor in the Alliance's history, and, whatever the U.S. Congress or the European parliaments decide, the idea that NATO is the effective mechanism for maintaining European security will be shattered.

Although cooler heads have recently prevailed, the Greco-Turkish rivalry could quickly reignite into a conflagration. Greco-Turkish disputes range over Cyprus, maritime rights and airspace in the Aegean, and alignments in the Balkans where Greece is sided with Serbia against Macedonia, and Turkey is aligned with Bosnia and Macedonia.

Turkey also blames Greece for its continued exclusion from the European Union. This rejection has produced an enormous reaction in Turkey which will reverberate there for a long time. How this will affect Ankara's position on a number of European and Balkan issues is unclear, but it is certain to exacerbate Greco-Turkish tensions.

The Cyprus issue will become more acute this year. The EU is about to start accession talks with Cyprus, which it refuses to do with Turkey. Cyprus is, meanwhile, purchasing Russian tanks and air defense weapons. If, as Turkey has threatened, it takes preemptive military action to prevent Russia from sending those tanks and air defense systems through the Straits, or Cyprus from otherwise receiving and deploying them, the consequences would be unpredictable. Thus the Cypriot issue not only afflicts the Alliance and the EU, it provides Moscow with an opportunity to undermine NATO and European security.

Moving back to the north, Bulgaria, Serbia, and Albania are all desperately poor and, along with Bosnia, could soon join the ranks of failed states. Bulgaria almost went bankrupt last year. Albania's situation will remain precarious in 1998.

Further to the north, the Baltic states will continue to press for NATO membership to counter what they perceive to be a Russian threat. Moscow has stated that any attempt to bring Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania into NATO would undermine the entire East-West relationship. Furthermore, France and Germany are likely to remain opposed to any Baltic expansion for the Alliance. Russia maintains a substantial military presence in Kaliningrad, supplying it through Lithuania. Furthermore, Moscow claims the right to intervene in the Baltic states and is constantly complaining about mistreatment of Russian minorities throughout the region. This could become a new focal point for conflict between the West and Russia. Over the next year and beyond, it will take a great deal of skill to prevent a crisis from boiling up in this region.

Trends and Issues.

- The presence of the SFOR remains fundamental to peace in Bosnia and its success a major test of NATO's relevance for the 21st century.
- Economic woes in Bulgaria, Albania, Bosnia and Serbia will continue in 1998.
- Contentious issues between Turkey and Greece could erupt into conflict.
- The issue of Baltic security will remain a difficult one and while accession into NATO is not likely, Russia, Germany, and the United States need to move artfully toward a reasonable accommodation that is acceptable to all.

Bosnia-Herzegovina

William T. Johnsen

In 1997, implementation of the Bosnian peace process begun at Dayton (November 1995) took on increased momentum. The NATO-led international Implementation Force (IFOR) transitioned successfully to the NATO-led Stabilization Force (SFOR). Sustained implementation of the military portions of the Dayton Accords proceeded smoothly. Factional armies remained under strict control, arms reductions and control regimes continued, and forces complied with the military requirements set out in the peace agreement.

Implementing the civil portions of the accords proceeded with fits and starts. On the one hand, successes must be acknowledged. National governmental institutions were established and took their first, although hesitant, steps toward a functioning common government. Municipal elections were held without major instances of violence and municipal governments were taking shape as the new year dawned. Police forces in many areas have completed—or are in the midst of—major reorganization and reform. A previously closed media saw the emergence, albeit limited, of a more open press to include printed and electronic media.

Economic reconstruction continues as unemployment has been cut nearly in half, commerce is returning, and international aid continues to assist in the economic recovery of the country. Transportation nodes and networks have been restored. Electricity and water resources are coming back on line. Natural gas supplies were secured for the winter. Reconstruction of homes and apartments continues as the standard of living for most Bosnians improves.

On the other hand, much of the limited progress in many areas only came after intense pressure from the

international community brought to bear on recalcitrant nationalist leaders who still dominate the political process. Internal Bosnian governmental institutions were difficult to establish and have been slow to assume their responsibilities. Cooperation within the Croat-Muslim Federation and between the Federation and the Republika Srpska officials remains minimal. That said, the recent rift between Ms. Plavsic and her supporters and the hard-liners headquartered in Pale has opened a split in the Bosnian Serb leadership that could lead to increased cooperation within the common governmental bodies.

Let there be no mistake, however, governments within Bosnia-Herzegovina still have a long way to go before they will effectively represent and serve the country as a whole. The national government must learn to cooperate and function in accord with the lines laid out in the General Framework Agreement for Peace. Municipal governments elected in September 1997 must be established and take responsibility for all their citizens, not just a singular ethnic group. This will be particularly difficult in some areas where an ousted, ethnically cleansed group received a majority of the votes for a municipality to which it is dangerous for them to return.

Given the mixed results of the past 2 years, many in the United States have questioned the need or the desirability of a continued U.S., and especially military, presence in Bosnia. While the debates surrounding these questions are essential for building an informed public, one key point stands out. The reasons that drove the United States to intervene militarily in Bosnia in the first place have not been overturned.

A withdrawal of U.S. military presence in Bosnia would trigger the withdrawal of allies and friends who have indicated that they will stay the course only as long as the United States does. Given the current state of affairs in Bosnia, the absence of an outside military force will lead to renewed conflict, as the sides seek to settle old scores and

use the recent operational pause to their advantage. Because of the relative decline in the capability of ethnic Serbian forces and a concomitant rise in the capabilities of Bosniak and Croatian forces, war would likely return with the Bosnian Serbs on the losing side. Should conditions deteriorate too far, Serbia might feel compelled to intervene in the conflict.

Even if Serbia stays out of another Bosnian war, once the Bosnian Serbs have been eliminated as a military power (and perhaps eliminated in another round of ethnic cleansing), Croats and Muslims could decide it is time to settle their own differences once and for all. In other words, considerable violence might spill into other parts of Southeastern and Central Europe, and further waves of refugees that could swamp already strained social systems in the remainder of Europe are some of the likely possibilities that argue against SFOR's departure in the near future.

None of these outcomes serve the interests of the United States. But these may not be the worst outcomes from the U.S. perspective. At the very least, a return to violence could discredit the U.S. leadership role in Europe, as well as NATO's leading role in the European security environment. The historic cooperation between the United States and Russia and NATO and Russia could be halted. NATO enlargement might be derailed. The example of a return to violence might spark ethnic uprisings in Kosovo or in Eastern Europe. A return of Iranian influence into Bosnia would have increasing geo-strategic import that could reverberate in U.S. policies in the Middle East and Southwest Asia.

In short, many of the likely outcomes of a U.S. withdrawal from military participation in the peace process in Bosnia hold great potential to adversely affect U.S. national interests in Europe and around the globe. Thus, from a purely selfish standpoint, the United States should

be prepared to extend its military participation in the Balkans peace process.

At the same time, the military instrument of power can only establish general conditions that contribute to peace. It is imperative for the United States, therefore, to build on the momentum of the last 9 months in implementing the civil portions of the accords. Continued support for measures that contribute to open media, more open political dialogue within and among Bosnia's ethnic factions, and reorganization and reform of police forces are imperative to long-term political settlement. The United States and the NATO-led international military force must undertake additional efforts to bring paramilitary organizations under effective control either through their incorporation into reformed police forces or under the paramilitary provisions of the Dayton Accords.

Further steps also must be taken to strengthen Bosnia's economic structures. This should be an international effort, where the United States provides its fair share of funding, aid and loans, and offers expertise to assist the Bosnian government in establishing laws, customs procedures, and a taxation system that facilitates international investment, while providing long-term economic viability for Bosnia and its citizens. Along these lines, the international community can take steps to assist in the fight against corruption and smuggling, which not only deny the legitimately elected governments the resources to care for their constituents, but also provide funding that supports corrupt ultranationalists who hinder the political and social healing process.

In sum, the peace process has begun to take root in Bosnia, but the roots have not sunk very deep. Additional time and commitment on the part of the United States and its European allies and partners will be required to bring peace to the region. A continued military presence by the United States beyond June 1998 is now a reality. This military presence may be reduced relative to current U.S. and SFOR force levels in the country. Nevertheless, the

residual force will have to maintain sufficient combat capability to deter acts of violence and to convince recalcitrant ultranationalist factions that they have more to gain from peace than they do by resorting to violence.

Asia Pacific

Stephen J. Blank

Regional Assessment.

Judging from 1997, the "Pacific Century" has begun. As in a roller coaster ride, slow but exciting ascents are followed by steep and abrupt descents.

On the positive side, we have the major Asian powers seeking to regularize their relationships to make them more predictable through a process of ongoing strategic dialogues manifested in discussions culminating in summits. For instance, Japan and the United States reconfigured their alliance by delimiting more precisely their military relationship in new guidelines that more clearly specify the responsibilities and obligations each will have in the event of a military contingency. Also four-power peacetalks have been started among the United States, China, North Korea, and South Korea to formally end the Korean War.

On the other hand, China continues to claim sovereignty over the Spratly Islands while its military modernization and buildup programs proceed. Meanwhile the Sino-Taiwanese relationship has not progressed much since 1996.

Overshadowing everything else was the financial crisis which gripped virtually every Asian economy except those of China and Singapore. The security repercussions with implications in 1998 are becoming increasingly apparent. For instance, the collapse of the Won, South Korea's currency, makes future massive investments to rehabilitate North Korea difficult and provides Pyongyang with less incentive to come to terms with Seoul. Japan, likewise, will find it more difficult to provide economic aid to North Korea, making a massive bailout similar to that which helped to ease German reunification far less likely. All this will have an impact on the course of talks to end the Korean War.

The financial crisis will continue to affect Southeast Asia where it has forced states like Thailand, Indonesia, and Malaysia to curtail future arms purchases on the scale they had anticipated as necessary to counter the dramatic Chinese military expansion programs. Defense industries from Russia to Europe to the United States will feel the effect of a shrinking market in Southeast Asia. Russia was counting on strong arms sales in the region to rescue its defense industry and to provide revenues needed to help stabilize the deterioration of the Russian armed forces. Without those revenues, military reform in Russia will be even less likely. Security trends in Asia throughout 1998 must reckon with the consequences of this economic crisis.

The other vexing issue that will focus our attention in 1998 and beyond is the Chinese military buildup. What is the nature of this buildup and what are China's strategic objectives? The two are related in that the way China is modernizing and reorganizing its military should reveal something about Chinese thinking, with a regard to how they see warfare now and in the future.

Many believe that the Chinese military is engaged in its own revolution in military affairs. China's large acquisitions of foreign technology from Russia, and, to a lesser degree from Israel and other Western states, and its dual use of technologies attained from the United States, conceivably could enable China to move toward a "great leap forward" as a military power.

Other strategic questions *vis-à-vis* China remain obscure. Who does China expect to fight and what kind of war does it envision? Is China seeking to be a regional hegemon, a Pacific power, or a world power? In any possible future use of military force to settle the Taiwan issue, does China anticipate fighting the United States or merely deterring it?

Taiwan will remain a significant strategic issue between China and the United States. Beijing is seemingly determined that Taiwan's future be regarded as an internal

matter between itself and a renegade province. Furthermore, China apparently believes that if Taiwan declares independence, this would free Beijing to put aside its policy of not using force to settle the matter. This issue could become urgent since the trend in Taiwan is toward an open break with the mainland.

Elsewhere in Asia, in states that are already fragile, the economic crisis could have devastating effects. In Cambodia and Myanmar for instance, or in places like Xingjiang Province where there are restive ethnic minorities, an economic slowdown might have repercussions on those states' ability to maintain control. One thing is certain, the current economic crisis will not contribute to regional stability in 1998.

Trends and Issues.

The economic crisis will dominate the Asian security landscape in 1998 with consequences that will reach well into the 21st century. Other trends and issues are as follows:

- The Korean peace process will create a range of issues and challenges in 1998. Unless North Korea's economy collapses completely, Pyongyang will use the talks to extract maximum benefits from everyone involved.
- The Chinese military buildup will continue in the year ahead and on into the 21st century. The nature of the buildup and the direction it takes should reveal a great deal about China's strategic vision.
- China will remain adamant about Taiwan being an internal issue. If China thinks political events on the island are moving Taipei toward a formal declaration of independence, a crisis could erupt into military action against Taiwan and possible confrontation with the United States.

- The long-standing issues attendant to the reaffirmation of the security relationship between the United States and Japan will be articulated more clearly in the first months of this year.
- The arms buildup across Asia will likely continue despite the current economic crisis. The Chinese buildup should accelerate *vis-à-vis* the other states since its economy has not been adversely affected by the current economic crisis.

The Middle East and Southwest Asia

Stephen C. Pelletiere

Regional Assessment.

The past year was not a good one for the United States in the Middle East and Southwest Asia, and prospects for improvements in 1998 are not sanguine. Washington suffered several reversals in the region in 1997, but three setbacks were particularly severe: the Doha Conference in Qatar; the Islamic conference in Tehran; and the continuing crisis with Saddam Hussein on U.N. weapons inspections.

The United States called for a Middle East economic summit to be held in Doha, Qatar, last November, to which it invited a large number of nations. The objective was to reach agreement on a regional economic package that would include Israel along with its Arab neighbors. For this conference to have had any opportunity for success, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates needed to be a part of it. Each of these nations pulled out of the conference and so did Egypt, the most politically important actor in the Middle East.

At the same time, Iran called an Islamic Summit in Tehran, inviting many of the same countries. All the Arab states that spurned the Doha Conference showed up in Tehran. Iran also invited Iraq to send a representative to Tehran, and Iraq responded by sending a high ranking official, Taha Yasin Ramadan, the Deputy Premier.

As of this writing, the crisis over U.N. inspection of suspected production and storage facilities for Iraqi weapons of mass destruction continues. Saudi Arabia has refused to allow U.S. use of its bases to strike at Iraq, and support for such a strike throughout the Arab world has been virtually nil.

Elsewhere in the Middle East, prospects for 1998 are not encouraging. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu

did not make good on his predecessor's promised withdrawal of substantial numbers of Israeli forces from the Occupied Territories, particularly around Hebron. Furthermore, Netanyahu has proclaimed that Israel will never abandon the Golan Heights, effectively precluding any possibility of a settlement with Syria or Lebanon. So far, Washington has been unable or unwilling to pressure the Israeli Prime Minister into softening his position, and Arab impatience with Washington's seeming inability—or disinclination—to produce substantive results is growing.

As 1997 drew to a close, the Arabs began translating frustration into policy and action. The refusal to attend the Doha conference, their willingness to attend the Tehran Summit, and the reluctance of some, notably Saudi Arabia, to support military action against Iraq are to a large extent due to the failure of the Arab-Israeli peace process.

The Arabs believe that the United States is pursuing a double standard because it allows Israel to defy the United Nations by refusing to give back Arab land, while holding Iraq to strict account. Many Arab leaders may also believe that Washington has downgraded the importance of the Gulf, no longer viewing the area as vital to American security interests. They believe the potential of Caspian Sea oil, and Washington's interest in it are indicative. The Arabs understand that if the petroleum "center of gravity" shifts north, the Persian Gulf could become a backwater in the world strategic equation. Accordingly, they suspect that if the United States had to choose between protecting Israel and maintaining its position in the Gulf, it would favor the former at the expense of the latter.

The consequence of all this is an extremely unsettled Middle East. How much worse things get depends on Washington's course of action in the weapons inspection crisis. It seems, as of this writing, that any approach U.S. policymakers adopt will cost the nation heavily. The only sure result seems to be the abandonment of Dual Containment. It is a policy that has failed by proving to be

too costly and, therefore, a new approach needs to be devised.

Elsewhere in the Middle East, in Egypt Husni Mubarak, who was pleased to be a broker in the Peace Process, has found his position weakened by the current impasse. Formerly, he had been able to keep Egypt close to Washington and Tel Aviv while also maintaining his lines of communications with the Arab states. In 1998, Cairo may have to choose between the economic benefits of having a close relationship with Washington and the historical and cultural continuity of its leadership in the Arab world. If Egypt has to choose, it will opt for maintaining good relations with Washington, for economic reasons. The challenge for Mubarak will be to do so while maintaining support of the Palestinians. If the U.S. Congress tries to pressure Egypt by threatening to cut economic aid, Egypt might retaliate by interfering with America's use of the Suez Canal, curtailing military-to-military relations, or possibly denying overflight rights.

Syria and Iraq are both ruled by Ba'thist regimes and have somewhat centrally-directed economies. Still, they have not been closely allied. One reason is that Iraq has tried to stay close to Turkey, counting on it to police the northern Kurdish areas, from which Baghdad is excluded. Last year, however, Turkey occupied a portion of northern Iraq to establish a security zone. Also, Turkey moved toward a loose military alliance with Israel.

Turkey's action has alienated Baghdad, and this has opened the way to an Iraqi rapprochement with Damascus. Syria has a deep and long-standing enmity toward Turkey, and Ankara's recent move toward Israel has infuriated Damascus. Given the strong personalities of Syria's Hafez Assad and Iraq's Saddam Hussein, it is unlikely they will conclude a formal alliance, but the relationship between the two nations is likely to warm as 1998 progresses.

If Syria and Iraq form some kind of an alliance, Iran might be enticed into making this a Tehran-Baghdad-

Damascus axis. The Iranians and the Syrians have been close for years and Damascus could facilitate the process of bringing Iran and Iraq together. The fact that Baghdad and Tehran both see their relationship in the Persian Gulf as a zero sum game militates against this eventuality. At the same time, both the northern Persian Gulf states fear the United States and this could drive them together.

In Turkey, Ankara has maintained its relationship with its Arab neighbors over the years even as European nations rebuffed it. In 1997, under pressure from the military, Turkey and Israel entered into a loose alliance. Whether this will bode good or ill for Turkey is hard to determine. Turkey will never be fully accepted by European powers. This turn toward Tel Aviv will alienate it from much of the Arab world as well.

Trends and Issues.

- The Israeli government will remain intransigent on concessions that might be acceptable to the Palestinians and their Arab neighbors. This will lead the Arab states to seek U.N. resolutions condemning Israel, which Washington will veto, thus alienating itself further from many Arab states.
- The United States will remain focused on Iraq until there is a resolution of the U.N. weapons inspection impasse. As of this writing, military action somewhere down the road seems likely.
- Iraq and Syria may move toward a closer relationship in the months ahead. It is possible that Iran may join in to form a Damascus-Baghdad-Tehran axis.
- King Hussein of Jordan will find his position increasingly untenable as the peace process falters.
- Turkey's recent moves toward Israel will extend its alienation from the Arab world.

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- Without progress on the peace front, Yasir Arafat will proclaim an independent Palestinian state, doing so against the wishes of both Israel and the United States.

Sub-Saharan Africa

Steven Metz

Regional Assessment.

Intense contradictions shape the security environment of Sub-Saharan Africa. On the positive side, African leaders are working to transcend their dependence on outsiders for the maintenance of regional stability. In the Central African Republic, for instance, African mediators and troops are helping resolve problems arising from an army uprising. In Liberia, a peacekeeping force led by Nigeria paved the way for an election which, hopefully, will signal the end of a long civil war. In southern Africa, regional states have held the first multinational military exercise in Africa designed to improve international cooperation during peacekeeping operations. Across the continent, the trend is clear: in the past African leaders would have looked to developed nations or the United Nations to oversee crisis resolution or organize efforts to deal with violence, but now are seeking to do so themselves.

On the down side, African leaders have shown no signs of abandoning their tendency to intervene in neighboring states. In fact, 1997 brought a dramatic increase in such activity. The largest and most important was the war in Zaire/Democratic Republic of the Congo that led to the ouster of Mobutu Sese Seko by forces under Laurent Kabila. A host of nations used this conflict to settle political scores with Mobutu (who had himself supported rebel movements in a number of neighboring states). Uganda, Burundi, Rwanda, Zambia, and Angola (among others) backed Kabila's rebels. In October 1997, Angola sent troops, tanks, and warplanes into the Congo Republic and helped Denis Sassou-Nguesso, the nation's former military ruler, overthrow elected president Pascal Lissouba. Clearly, the adage that "my enemy's enemy is my friend" still dominates the African security environment.

Other contradictions also shook Sub-Saharan Africa during the past year. In a number of nations, a robust civil society continued to grow, fueled by a burgeoning free press and a wide range of political interest groups. Elections were held in states that had long been under authoritarian rule. Many African nations also continued free market reforms. This was, in part, responsible for a turnaround from the economic stagnation of the 1970s and 1980s with more than half of the nations of Sub-Saharan Africa showing growth rates of at least 5 percent in the past 2 years.

At the same time, the factors that hindered democratization and development in the past persisted. Corruption, government parasitism, military involvement in politics, the ethnicization of politics, regional and ethnic violence, intolerance for political opposition by regimes, a shortage of capital, and economic dependence posed serious obstacles. As a result, many elected governments remain insecure while authoritarian leaders fear the passion that reform might unleash. The ouster of the elected president of the Congo Republic was a stark illustration of the fragility of reform in Africa. There are additional examples. In Zambia, President Frederick Chiluba had to stave off a military coup. In Cameroon, the reelection of President Paul Biya was widely considered a mockery of democracy. In nations like the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Kenya, and Nigeria, the governments continue to reject unfettered political competition.

No one can tell how or if these contradictions will be resolved. If African leaders break their dependence on outsiders, eschew interventionism in neighboring states, consolidate democracy and political openness, and continue free market reforms, the regional security environment will eventually stabilize. If African leaders fail at any of these things, the violence and conflict that has characterized recent decades will continue. The point of decision for African leaders is close. This will be a telling year in the region's future and the prospects for positive change are contingent on several things:

- The emergence, expansion, and consolidation of a group of leaders in Africa willing to eschew corruption, nepotism, and personal rule, and to tolerate political opposition and limits to their rule;
- The continued transformation of civil-military relations including the building of armies that accept civilian rule and service to the citizens of their nation rather than intimidation or parasitism, and the development of effective, uncorrupt civilian leaders and administrators who understand the military and are willing to respect its areas of professional competence;
- A change in the rules of the African security environment, especially rejection of proxy violence, renunciation of the attitude that "my enemy's enemy is my friend," and abandonment of the tendency to use food and medicine as power resources in conflicts;
- Resolution or control of the ethnic conflict that has inflamed Africa, especially central African nations like Rwanda, Burundi and the Democratic Republic of the Congo;
- The beginning of peaceful yet fundamental reform in Nigeria (which remains a very dangerous powder keg under the Abacha dictatorship);
- Adequate growth in the world economy to allow Africa to continue free market reforms; and,
- Continued support from the developed nations until political and economic reforms are consolidated.

American Strategy.

Today American influence in Sub-Saharan Africa may be at an all-time high. France, traditionally the most active outside actor, has been discredited by a series of very bad

policy choices such as support to the Rwandan regime that engineered a genocide in 1994 and continued backing of Mobutu. Many African leaders have concluded that support from the United States comes with fewer strings than that from some other nations, and that Washington can muster the resources to make things happen once it decides to act. Adding to this is an increase in interest in Africa on the part of the Clinton administration. Clinton's appointment of prominent figures to African policymaking posts is one indication of the importance attached to Africa. For instance, during the past year the President named the Reverend Jesse Jackson Special Envoy and Secretary of State for the Promotion of Democracy in Africa. In another key appointment, Susan Rice, who had held key posts in the Department of Defense and National Security Council, was named Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs. And Clinton's visit to Africa in March will represent a new high in American attention to Africa.

But just as the African security environment is replete with contradictions and paradoxes, so too is American policy. While official U.S. interest and influence is relatively high, public and congressional concern remains low except for the occasional period of a major humanitarian disaster. The United States has substantial national interests in Sub-Saharan Africa, but none of these could be considered vital. While the United States seeks reform in Africa, it can only devote limited resources—whether time or money—to the task. The challenge is finding ways to encourage Africans to undergo change within the confines of resource limitations. This is a very difficult problem that demands the utmost skill from the architects of American policy.

To do this, the Clinton strategy in Africa has moved along two tracks. The first is focused on the root causes of instability and conflict, especially poverty and underdevelopment. Following a pattern the United States pursued in Latin America and the Caribbean, the administration concluded that trade incentives rather than

increases in foreign aid would be most effective and politically feasible. This certainly seemed sound: by 1996, trade between the United States and Africa was greater than America's trade with Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Republics. To encourage this trend, President Clinton joined with a bipartisan group from Congress to press for legislation that would give the poorest countries in Africa duty-free access to American markets for a number of products, reduce tariffs on additional products for countries that are liberalizing their economies, eliminate bilateral debt for the poorest nations, and use government guarantees through the Overseas Private Investment Corporation to encourage investment in Sub-Saharan Africa.

The security track of Clinton's Africa strategy focuses on helping regional leaders develop their own capacity for conflict prevention and peacekeeping. The highest profile program to emerge from this has been the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI). Given the frequency of violence in Africa, the tendency of conflicts to generate refugee problems and humanitarian disasters, and the global demands on the American military, American policymakers often expressed an interest in the formation of an African peacekeeping policy that might lessen the need for outside intervention. In mid-1996, a looming crisis in Burundi revived the idea and made it the centerpiece of American security policy in Africa. During a 1996 visit to Africa, then-Secretary of State Warren Christopher introduced a plan for an African Crisis Response Force to be trained and supported by the United States and other developed nations.

Because the new proposals lacked definition in critical features and the specifics of external support, the African response was tepid. But the Clinton administration chose to refine the idea rather than abandon it. In early 1997, an experienced foreign service officer and former U.S. ambassador in Africa, Marshall McCallie, was assigned to lead an interagency working group (IWG) overseeing the

project. The IWG renewed consultation with African and European governments, listening to their concerns and soliciting moral and material support for the program. In deference to African sensitivities, the IWG changed the name of the project from African Crisis Response Force to African Crisis Response Initiative, implying that a force of some sort might be formed in the future but the initial goals were more modest.

The IWG formulated a long-range approach and training plan, and crafted a relationship between ACRI and the United Nations. The U.S. Congress provided \$15 million in ACRI funding for fiscal year 1997. By mid-1997, Washington had obtained commitments from seven African countries to furnish eight battalions for training. The U.S. Army Special Forces began instructing Ugandan and Senegalese units in the late summer of 1997. Meanwhile, Ambassador McCallie and other administration officials sought continued financial support from Congress.

Clearly ACRI is a useful step in the evolution of American strategy in Africa. African units trained by American Special Forces probably will prove more effective at peacekeeping. The African troops and their leaders should gain insights into better ways of dealing with civilians. And, ACRI should open useful channels of communication among African states. But from a strategic perspective, the question is whether ACRI becomes the first step in a wider U.S. effort to encourage the transformation of the African security environment or simply a stand-alone program persisting only until Washington's interest fades.

Long-Term Prognosis.

Given the number of things that must happen for Africa to undergo the sort of reform it needs, optimism does not come easily. So many factors—some beyond the control of Africans—can derail the reform process and send the region tumbling back toward economic stagnation, political repression, and endemic violence. During the next decade,

the most likely course of events is the division of Sub-Saharan Africa into three distinct parts defined by politics rather than language, ideology, or some other factor.

The first part of a trisected Africa would consist of those states with wise leaders able to make steady movement toward economic and political openness. Barring some sort of post-Mandela disintegration, South Africa will fall into this category. So too will Zimbabwe and Uganda if Presidents Mugabe and Museveni begin to accept greater political competition and opposition. Kenya has the potential, but President Moi must also begin serious movement toward political openness or face increasing opposition, isolation, and, perhaps, violence. The second part of a trisected Africa might include states which do not attempt reform or fail at it, whether due to an inadequate base of human and natural resources, irreconcilable schisms, or poor leadership. Here conflict, violence, decay, and humanitarian disasters will be the norm; crisis will be persistent. The third part will be characterized by *intermittent* crisis. The leaders of the nations in this group will cling to the old patterns of authoritarianism, parasitism, corruption, controlled economics, and repression. On a regular basis, interlinked economic and political problems will lead to widespread opposition and, sometimes, violence. Facing internal and international pressure, regimes will undertake half-hearted political and economic reforms. When these generate a temporary lull in the crises, the regimes will back away from reform. Soon the old problems will return, and the cycle will start again.

For the United States and the rest of the developed world, a trisected Africa will require a three dimensional strategy entailing support for the governments of reforming nations, humanitarian relief in the zone of permanent crisis, and a carrot-and-stick prodding of regimes which have relegated themselves to cyclical crisis. The best that can be hoped is that the zone of reform is large and the zones of crisis small.

One thing is certain, though: whether the African security environment improves or degrades, the U.S. Army will play an important role in American strategy. Army engagement through ACRI and other programs can help Africans reform their systems of civil-military relations and build a regional peacekeeping capacity. But if such efforts fail, the U.S. Army is still likely to be deployed to Africa to help with noncombatant evacuations, assist with relief operations during humanitarian disasters, and support the stabilization of failed states. The Army, in other words, has a major stake in the reform of the African security environment. If policymakers in Washington and Africa make wise decisions, the role of the U.S. Army will be to help consolidate reform. If they do not, the Army, as so often happened in the past, will be called on to help control the suffering that results.

Trends and Issues.

- Can Nigeria stave off internal violence and international pressure?
- Can Laurent Kabila establish some degree of stability in the Democratic Republic of the Congo?
- Will the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, and Burundi remain plagued by ethnic violence? If not, will this generate another humanitarian disaster?
- Will African leaders begin to abandon the tendency to intervene in neighboring states which has become so prevalent in the past few years? Will Africa and the world community establish means of punishing states like Angola which continue to do so?
- Will recent signs that the governments of South Africa and Zimbabwe intend to pressure their prosperous white minorities lead to conflict and economic problems in those countries?

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- Will American attention to Africa, which may be at an all time high, be sustained or prove transitory?
 - Will efforts to augment Africa's organic resolution and peacekeeping capabilities continue?

Latin America

Donald E. Schulz

Regional Assessment.

At least through 2008, threats to peace, stability, progressive growth, and democracy in Latin America will come from political extremes and deeply-rooted economic, social and political problems. The regional interests of the United States will remain basically the same over the next decade: promoting democracy, sustainable economic growth, economic integration, a curtailment of the drug trade, and stopping illegal migration into the United States. Most countries will maintain the gradual pace of democratization, with a few oscillating between democratic form and authoritarian substance. This trend will be especially apparent where democratically-elected governments lose legitimacy due to a failure to meet popular expectations.

A large urban population, with attendant socio-economic problems associated with decapitalization, corruption, violent crime and poverty, will create conditions promoting emigration, terrorism, insurgency, and an enhanced role for the military in internal security. Assistance from the United States to reinforce democratic institutions and build strong economies will be important, in concert with that extended by other countries in stemming authoritarian responses.

The coming decade may witness a significant decline in U.S. imports of Latin American cocaine, as that product is displaced by synthetic drugs which can be manufactured in the United States. Nevertheless, tens of thousands of farmers will continue to engage in the coca growing business in Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia. Especially in Colombia, narco-traffickers will continue to conduct cocaine-related processing activities. In Mexico, Central America and South America, poppy cultivation will persist. Brazil and Venezuela will join the ranks of the important

narco-producing states. These activities, including the increased manufacture of synthetic drugs, will fuel growing use of illegal narcotics in Latin America itself.

Economic underdevelopment and wide gaps between rich and poor will continue to produce high levels of illegal migration into the United States, mostly from or through Mexico. Refugees from political persecution will join immigrants seeking economic opportunity. Caribbean migration will increase substantially and could very well reach crisis proportions if the Castro regime comes to a violent end. Castro himself will probably be gone by 2008. In the meantime, however, economic hardship in Cuba will continue to provide a strong incentive for emigration, and, if relations with Washington remain poor, the regime may encourage further exoduses to release domestic political pressures or to retaliate against the United States. Economic hardship and political violence will continue to push Haitians towards the United States. Additionally, by the 21st century, immigration from the Dominican Republic will be recognized as the serious problem it already is.

The policy answer to most of these concerns is the nurturing of democracy and sustainable economic growth, leading to a higher standard of living for most Latin Americans. A viable counterdrug strategy is also needed. Some of these issues have been addressed in the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative, the North American Free Trade Agreement, and the Andean Drug Strategy. The real challenge for the United States will be how to turn policy into strategy and executable programs.

Trends and Issues.

- Threats to democratic governments will increase due to urban overpopulation, unemployment, socio-economic inequalities, weak economies, corruption, human rights abuses, and an authoritarian political culture.

- Environmental degradation and exploitation of nonrenewable resources will continue with a major ecological disaster developing in the Amazon Basin.
- While synthetic drugs will cut sharply into the cocaine market by lowering profits for some cartels, the overall U.S. market for drugs will probably grow.
- Illegal immigration will continue to pose major social, economic and political problems for the United States.
- Peru and Colombia will continue to be plagued by a chronic mix of insurgency and drug trafficking. The problem will become so severe in Colombia that it could lead to the balkanization of the country.
- Democratic regimes in Venezuela, Peru, Bolivia, and Paraguay could all fall victim to authoritarian restoration.
- The political crisis in Haiti will reemerge with political instability, violence and authoritarian rule likely to return.
- The short-term outlook for the Brazilian economy is uncertain. Major social and economic challenges remain unresolved, including poverty, violent crime, corruption, inequitable distribution of income, landlessness, and environmental degradation.
- Argentina must make a successful transition to the post-Menem era if democracy is to survive. If the economy stays healthy, then democracy may succeed.
- Mexico's political and socio-economic problems will persist, and the country's political future remains uncertain.
- The movement to expand NAFTA, stalled since the Mexican peso crisis, will gradually reemerge.

Subregional integration efforts, such as MERCOSUR, a southern common market including Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay, and Uruguay, with Chile joining, will continue.

- The United States will continue to support democratization throughout the region. The possibility of one or more military interventions in the next decade is substantial, with Haiti and Cuba prime candidates.

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